We consider the problem of conducting a survey with the goal of obtaining an unbiased estimator of some population statistic when individuals have unknown costs (drawn from a known prior) for participating in the survey. Individuals must be compensated for their participation and are strategic agents, and so the payment scheme must incentivize truthful behavior. We derive optimal truthful mechanisms for this problem for the two goals of minimizing the variance of the estimator given a fixed budget, and minimizing the expected cost of the survey given a fixed variance goal.
INTRODUCTION
Consider the idealized process of conducting a survey: individuals x can be randomly sampled from some population X, and can be asked a question q for some q : X → {0, 1}. If the goal is to estimate E x∈X [q(x)], then the empirical average of q(x) gives us an unbiased estimator, and indeed, only O(1/α 2 ) samples are required to estimate this quantity to within accuracy ±α with high probability.
However, as with many things in life, conditions are rarely ideal. Although it may be possible to randomly sample individuals from a population, it is not always possible to convince them to participate in a survey. Participation is not without cost, and individuals are self interested. Therefore, although the population sampled for the survey may be random, the population that actually responds to the survey is biased towards the subset of the population that has a low cost for participating, which may significantly distort the results. This problem can be partially alleviated by compensating individuals for their participation. But what is the right level of compensation? For a variety of reasons, including varying time constraints and privacy concerns, the cost for participating in a survey can vary substantially from individual to individual. Any fixed level of compensation 1 will therefore still result in a biased sample. We assume that either the agents will not lie about the content of the survey, or that their responses are somehow otherwise verifiable.
On the other hand, costs for participation are known only to the individuals and not to the surveyor, and so it is not possible to simply pay each sampled individual exactly their cost for participation. They cannot simply be asked their cost, because as rational agents, they can mis-report their true costs if it is financially beneficial for them to do so. The surveyors problem therefore lies in the realm of mechanism design: he must determine a payment rule that properly incentivizes individuals from the population to report their true cost for participation.
In this paper, we initiate the formal study of the surveyors problem from the perspective of mechanism design. We consider the problem of computing an unbiased estimator of some statistic E x∈X [q(x)] when individuals from X have varying costs for participation drawn from a known prior F . We derive optimal truthful mechanisms for minimizing the variance of the estimate given a fixed budget on the expected cost of the survey, and for minimizing the expected cost of the survey given a fixed constraint on the variance of the estimator. Our mechanism is simple, practical, and ex-post dominant strategy truthful.
Our Results
Given a prior distribution on costs F, we show how to conduct an survey that optimally trades off the expected variance 2 of an unbiased estimator with the expected cost. We first prove a characterization theorem that greatly simplifies our design space: we show that for any truthful surveying mechanism, there exists another truthful surveying mechanism that merely makes take-it-or-leave-it offers that constructs an identical estimator, and has the same expected cost. Therefore, we may without loss of generality restrict our attention to take-it-or-leave-it survey mechanisms when seeking to optimize any function of the survey's estimator as it relates to the expected cost of the survey.
Then, under an extremely mild regularity condition on the prior distribution on costs F , we derive the form of a surveying mechanism which optimizes any continuous, convex, and monotone function of the cost and variance of the mechanism. In particular, this allows us to derive the surveying mechanism which achieves the minimum variance unbiased estimator of a population statistic subject to a cost constraint, and similarly, the minimum cost mechanism subject to a variance constraint.
Because we are optimizing over the class of take-it-or-leave-it mechanisms (to be defined), our optimization problem reduces to finding the optimal distribution over offer prices. We note that if this were an unconstrained optimization problem, it would end up being a relatively simple exercise in the calculus of variations. However, because we must solve for a function which is a valid probability distribution, we are facing a constrained optimization problem which results in a number of technical complications.
Related Work
The problem of survey design has a long history, and is the topic of an entire field of inquiry in statistics. The idea that survey results may be biased because different individuals may have different proclivities for answering the survey as a function of their types (due to stigmatizing questions) goes back at least to Warner [War65], who proposed a "randomized response" approach to lessen the cost of answering a stigmatizing question. The statistical literature tends to approach the problem by making distributional assumptions about the relationship between survey response and data type, and attempts to avoid bias by compensating for these differences or imputing the values of missing data. We do not attempt to survey this vast literature, but refer the interested reader to useful texts on this topic [LL91; SMOG11]. In particular, our work differs from this literature in that we do not make any assumptions about the relationship between data value and response rate, but instead take a mechanism-design approach and model survey respondents as rational agents with private costs for participating in the survey, and insist on truthful survey mechanisms which incentivize sufficient response rate to provide accurate statistical estimates, without assumptions on how costs are related to types. Crucially, we are prepared to pay individuals for their participation, and rely on their rational responses to guarantee the accuracy of our estimators.
The field of Bayesian optimal mechanism design originated with the groundbreaking work of Myerson [Mye81], which (in certain settings) characterized the auction rule which maximizes seller revenue, given a known prior on the distribution over buyer values. See, e.g., [Kri09] for a survey of the literature that has followed. In this work, we take the methodology of Bayesian optimal mechanism design and apply it to the problem of survey design. We assume a known prior over costs for individuals participation, but assume that the correlation between costs and survey responses is worst-case. We then design truthful survey mechanisms for calculating unbiased estimators while minimizing various objective functions (i.e. minimizing the variance of the estimator given a cost constraint, or minimizing the cost of the survey given a variance constraint, as well as more general objectives).
Recently, the problem of designing truthful mechanisms to estimate statistics from a population which explicitly experiences costs for privacy loss was introduced by Ghosh and Roth [GR11]. Subsequently (and concurrently with this work), Ligett and Roth [LR12] extend this work to sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers. Although it has similar goals, this line of work differs from the current paper in that it measures cost using the formalism of differential privacy, and more importantly, takes a worst-case view and does not assume a known prior over agent costs. In contrast, here we use a prior over agent costs to derive optimal mechanisms. This paper can be viewed as answering an open question posed by [GR11] , which asked whether the approach of Bayesian-optimal mechanism design could be brought to bear on the data gathering problem when the distribution over agent costs was known.
PRELIMINARIES

Model and Mechanism Design Basics
We consider a surveyor who is interested in some population statistic defined by a predicate on individuals, q : X → {0, 1}. We model each individual x i ∈ X as having an unknown cost c i ≥ 0 for participating in the survey (i.e. for revealing the bit q(x i )). Individuals and costs (x i , c i ) are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution D: (x i , c i ) ∼ D, and the surveyor wishes to estimate E (xi,ci)∼D [q(x i )]. Note that c i and x i can be arbitrarily correlated. We denote by F the marginal distribution of D on c. We will often assume that costs take values in the range [1, ∞]. The value 1 is arbitrary and does not affect our results: we just wish to avoid the degenerate case of distributions for which there is non-zero measure at cost c = 0. We write f for the probability density function for F , and write F for the cumulative density function. We assume that f is piecewise differentiable except, possible, on a measure 0 set. The surveying mechanism knows (and can be a function of) F , the marginal distribution on costs, but has no other knowledge of D. We write n to denote the number of individuals sampled by the surveying mechanism.
A survey mechanism consists of an allocation rule A : R + → [0, 1] and a possibly randomized payment ruleP : R + → R ≥0 . We define P :
At time i, the mechanism can sample an individual (x i , c i ) ∼ D, elicit their reported costĉ i , and then with probability A(ĉ i ) collect the survey sample q(x i ) in exchange for a paymentP (ĉ i ). With the remaining probability 1 − A(ĉ i ) the mechanism does not conduct the survey and does not make any payment. Note that with such mechanisms, whether or not an individual is surveyed is independent of the values of the other individuals. This independence property is valuable in a surveying mechanism, because it means that the survey can be conducted in a distributed manner by many surveyors who each perhaps have a quota of responses to collect, but need not communicate otherwise.
We model individuals as having quasi-linear utility functions and being expectation maximizers. An individual with cost c i who reports costĉ i to a surveying mechanism, experiences cost P (ĉ i ) − c i when the survey is conducted, which occurs with probability A(ĉ i ). Therefore their expected utility is:
Note that this only depends onP via its expectation P . We want our surveying mechanisms to be able to give accuracy guarantees even in the presence of rational, selfish agents who wish to maximize their own utility. Therefore we require that our mechanisms be truthful and individually rational.
Definition 2.2 (Individual Rationality). A surveying mechanism (A, P ) is individually rational if for allĉ i resulting in the survey being conducted:
Informally, truthfulness states that a utility-maximizing agent can do no better than reporting his true cost faithfully to the surveying mechanism, and individual rationality states that no individual can ever be forced to experience negative utility.
Truthfulness and individual rationality impose the constraints on our design space for truthful surveys. We now define the objective that we wish to maximize within this space. When a transaction is made with an individual i through the mechanism (which occurs with probability A(c i )), he supplies his bit q(x i ) ∈ {0, 1}. The mechanism compiles these bits into an estimator S of the statistic E (x,c)∼D [q(x)]. We require that our mechanisms give unbiased estimates.
where the randomness of E[S(D, A, n)] is taken over the random choices of the sampled individuals (x i , c i ) ∼ D for i ∈ [n] and the internal randomness of the mechanism allocation rule A.
We wish to design mechanisms for constructing unbiased estimators of E (x,c)∼D [q(x)] while minimizing variance.
Definition 2.4 (variance). The variance of a random variable S(D, A, n) is:
Note that Var(S) depends on the unknown distribution D 3 , even though the mechanism knows only the marginal distribution over costs, F . Therefore, our measure of performance will be worst case variance over all distributions D consistent with the marginal distribution F : Definition 2.5 (Worst case variance). The worst case variance of a random variable S(D, A, n) given a marginal distribution on costs F is:
where the maximum is taken over all distributions D consistent with F .
When the distribution is not known, it is not always possible to design the minimum variance unbiased estimator of a distribution parameter. Therefore, we will concentrate on linear estimators in this paper.
Definition 2.6. An estimator S is linear if for each individual i from which the mechanism elicits q(x i ), there is a multiplier β(c i ) such that:
We will want to measure the expected cost of running a truthful survey. The mechanism only needs to make a payment P (c i ) when a transaction with agent i occurs, which happens with probability A(c i ). Therefore we can derive the expected cost of a truthful mechanism with prior F . The following claim is immediate:
CLAIM 2.7. The expected cost of surveying n individuals with a truthful mechanism (A, P ) is:
For intuition's sake, we here give an example of a non-trivial truthful lottery mechanism:
Example 2.8. For values c i ∈ [1, ∞], consider a lottery mechanism with A(x) = 1/x 2 and P (x) = 2x. Note that we always have P (x) ≥ x and so the mechanism is individually rational. Observe that it is also truthful. For any individual i, we have:
taking the derivative with respect toĉ i , we can see that this quantity is always maximized whenĉ i = c i , which is the condition needed for truthfulness.
Calculus of Variations Basics
In this paper we will seek to minimize the cost and variance of our mechanisms, which are functionals of our chosen allocation rule A and pricing rule P . Functional minimization problems are addressed by the calculus of variations. Here we give an informal introduction to the required (very basic) preliminaries. This can be found, for example, in [Lib12]. Let U be a space of functions over which we would like to optimize. Let M : U → R. The first variation (which is corresponds to the Gateaux derivative) of M at G ∈ U in the directionĜ is simply
A direction is feasible if G + Ĝ ∈ U for sufficiently small . We only deal with convex U . In this case every feasible direction of a derivative at G can be written asĜ − G for someĜ ∈ U .
For a convex U , we say that G is a minimizer (or local minimum) of M if for every feasible directionĜ we have that δM |G (Ĝ) ≥ 0.
For a convex U , we call
If M and U are convex than any minimizer is also a global minimum. If M is strictly convex and U is convex than any minimizer is also a unique global minimum.
We will use Lagrange Multipliers. If we are trying to minimize M : U ×R → R subject to the constraint H : U × R → R, then by properties of Lagrange Multipliers we must have that any direction that decreases M is in the tangent space of the constraints.
SIMPLIFYING THE DESIGN SPACE
In this section, we show that without loss of generality, we can restrict our attention to a simple class of mechanisms. This is analogous to Myerson's characterization of single parameter domains [Mye81], applied here to the survey setting.
Definition 3.1. A take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) lottery mechanism is defined by a distribution G over R + with probability density function g and cumulative density function G. Given a price x from an agent, A(x) and P (x) are then computed as follows:
Thus A andP are completely determined by G. Namely A(c) = 1 − G(c); andP (c) is the distribution G conditioned on being greater than c.
We first observe that a TIOLI lottery mechanism is truthful and individually rational.
THEOREM 3.2. Any take-it-or-leave-it lottery mechanism is truthful and individually rational.
PROOF. It is immediate that TIOLI mechanisms are individually rational, since whenever A(c i ) = 1 we have c i ≤ p i and so: P (c i ) = p i ≥ c i . To see that the mechanism is truthful, observe that for each fixed p i , if c i ≤ p i then individual i gets utility p i − c i for every reported valuationĉ i ≥ p i and utility 0 for every reported valuationĉ i < p i . If c i ≤ p i then p i − c i ≥ 0 and the so the utility of reportingĉ i = c i is non-negative and is not changed by over-reportingĉ i > c i (and under-reporting can only reduce the payoff to 0). If c i > p i then p i − c i < 0, which cannot be improved by under-reportingĉ i < c i (and over-reporting can only result in negative utility).
We now show that without loss of generality, we may restrict our attention to TIOLI lottery mechanisms: that is, every lottery mechanism (A, P ) is implementable as a TIOLI lottery mechanism with the same allocation rule and the same expected payment. We first show a simple lemma: that in any truthful lottery mechansim, the allocation rule must be monotonically decreasing in the reported cost. The proof of this lemma is simple and follows [Mye81] -we include it in the full version. LEMMA 3.3. If (A, P ) is a truthful lottery mechanism, then A(x) must be monotonically decreasing in x.
THEOREM 3.4. Every truthful differentiable allocation rule A : R + → [0, 1] is implementable as a take-it-or-leave-it lottery mechanism with the same allocation rule A(x) and the same expected payment E[A(x)P (x)].
PROOF. Fix an allocation rule A * and a corresponding payment rule P * so that (A * , P * ) is a truthful lottery mechanism. Define a TIOLI lottery mechanism with allocation and payment rules denoted A, P respectively, by defining the distribution over offers G to be the distribution with probability density function g(
and so g is a valid probability density function. Now consider the probability that this TIOLI mechanism transacts with an individual i with cost c i : this occurs exactly when the sampled offer p i is such that p i ≥ c i , which occurs with probability:
Thus the given TIOLI lottery mechanism implements exactly the allocation rule A. It remains to show that the expected payment of both mechanisms are the same:
Now consider the utility of agent i reporting value x to mechanism (A * , P * ):
By the truthfulness of this mechanism, for every value of c i , this expression is maximized by setting x = c i . Write the function A * P * (x) = A * (x)P * (x). Taking the derivative of the above expression and setting it to zero, we have simultaneously for all values c: d dc (A * P * (c)) = c · d dc (A * (c)). Integrating both sides of the above equality from x to ∞ we have:
In other words, for all x:
Remark 3.5. The requirement that the allocation rule is differentiable is for technical convenience, and can be relaxed to a more mild piecewise differentiable condition.
We have just seen that with respect to allocation and payment rules, we can restrict our attention without loss of generality to TIOLI mechanisms. What about unbiased estimators? In our setting, as it happens, the celebrated Horvitz-Thompson estimator is the unique unbiased linear estimator, and therefore the linear unbiased estimator of minimum variance, independent of the distribution D.
Definition 3.6 (Horvitz-Thompson Estimator) . For an allocation rule A(x), the Horvitz-Thompson estimator computes: S HT (D, A, n 
A(ci) , If the mechanism transacts with individual i; 0,
Otherwise.
THEOREM 3.7 ([HT52]). For every distribution D and every allocation rule A, S HT (D, A, n) is the minimum variance linear unbiased estimator of E[q(x i )].
Moreover, the Horvitz-Thompson estimator is admissible among the set of all unbiased estimators of E (x,c)∼D [q(x)] [GJ65] (even non-linear estimators). This means that the estimator is un-dominated: there is no other estimator that has lower variance than S HT with respect to every distribution D.
Therefore, for the rest of the paper, we restrict our attention to TIOLI mechanisms that use the Horvitz-Thompson estimator.
Price and Variance of TIOLI mechanisms that use the Horvitz-Thompson estimator
In this section we derive the cost and variance of the TIOLI mechanisms that use the Horvitz-Thompson estimator.
Recall that for a TIOLI mechanism with price distribution G, we have:
We can compute (up to additive error 1/n) the worst case variance of a TIOLI mechanism characterized by distribution G:
LEMMA 3.8. The worst-case variance of a Horvitz-Thompson TIOLI mechanism parameterized with distribution G used on a marginal value distribution F for n iterations is:
1
The proof is a simple calculation which can be found in the full version.
Instead of optimizing for the worst-case expected variance Var * (A(G), F , n) we will optimize for V * (A(G), F , n), since V * (A(G), F, n) is a very good approximation and will be much more convenient. Additionally, we note that if we change the estimator slightly to bẽ
Then this is an unbiased estimator of 1 − 2E[q(x i )] with expected variance exactly V * (A(G), F , n).
For a TIOLI mechanism Cost(A(G), P (G), n) and V * (A(G), F, n) can we written in terms of F, G and n, and no longer need to be stated in terms of D, A, or P . Thus we will, in the future, denote them by Cost(F , G, n) and V * (F , G, n) , and will often put fixed terms in the subscripts (e.g. Cost F ,n (G)). CLAIM 3.9. Let F , G, andĜ have piecewise twice differentiable CDFs, then
This last step we switch the integrals, which we can do because f and g are piecewise continuous. The claim follows.
DERIVING OPTIMAL MECHANISMS
In this section, we derive optimal TIOLI mechanisms that use the Horvitz-Thompson estimator. Recall that such mechanisms are defined by a distribution G over prices p ∈ [0, ∞) with CDF G and pdf g. In the previous section, we derived formulas for the cost, Cost (F , G, n) , and worst-case expected variance, V * (F , G, n) with error at most ±1/n.
We now derive optimal mechanisms for minimizing the variance subject to a cost constraint, and minimizing cost subject to a constraint on the variance, where F is a distribution that satisfies a certain regularity condition. In the case where the number of participants is fixed, we can extend this to design optimal mechanisms for any possible convex minimization objective function.
We will assume that F is twice differentiable for all positive x, that n is fixed We remark that this assumption can be further relaxed so that f is piecewise twice differentiable.
We optimize over the class of distributions with piece-wise twice differentiable CDF. Also, without loss of generality, we require that G has no support less than every point in the support of F except possibly a point mass at zero. This is clearly without loss of generality as any such offer will never be accepted. We do this so that we can (often) claim the uniqueness of optimal solutions.
We first define what the optimal will be. To this end we first definẽ
As above, if G is a CDF, we will denote the corresponding density function by g.
For the correct setting of α,G F ,α will be a (possibly infeasable) CDF of the local minimum.G F ,α may be decreasing or negative and thus infeasible as a cumulative density function. We first construct a monotone version ofG F ,α , then we make it positive.
Next
to get the new interval (ǐ k , j k ). Discard any intervals that are subsets of other intervals, and relabel the remaining intervals asĪ
. Also, for x ∈Ī we have thatǧ F ,α (x) = 0. This leaves onlyī k andj k to check. By inspectionǦ F ,α is non-decreasing atj k for all k (it is continuous and all surrounding derivatives are non-negative). At anyī k we have thatǦ F ,α (ī k ) =G F ,α (j k ), but that at all points to the leftǦ F ,α (ī k − ) =G F ,α (ī k − ), which limits toG F ,α (ī k ) so we must show thatG F ,α (ī k ) ≤G F ,α (j k ). However, this follows from the construction of I k be-
BecauseǦ is non-decreasing, by constructionḠ is also. Also, by construction 0 ≤
and soḠ(x) goes to 1 as x increases.
Remark 4.2. We remark that Cost(F,Ḡ F ,α , n) and V * (F ,Ḡ F ,α , n) are continuous in α and are monotonically increasing and monotonically decreasing in α, respectively. THEOREM 4.3. Let F be twice differentiable for all positive x, and let n be fixed. The unique minimizer of V * F ,n (G) subject to an expected cost constraint Cost F ,n (G) ≤ B, is of the formḠ F ,α (x) where α is unique. Also, the unique minimizer of Cost F ,n (G) subject to a worst-case expected variance constraint V * F ,n (G) ≤ B, is of the formḠ F ,α (x) where α is unique.
THEOREM 4.4. Let Φ(x 1 , x 2 ) be continuous, convex, and monotone in both of its inputs; let F be twice differentiable for all positive x, and let n be fixed. The unique minimizer of Φ (Cost(F , G, n) , V * (F , G, n) ) is of the formḠ F ,α (x) where α is unique. Moreover, this is also guaranteed to be the global minimum.
In this last theorem, the number of participants in the survey is no longer fixed, and we allow a cost to be associated with recruiting each participant independently of whether or not they accept.
THEOREM 4.5. Let F be twice differentiable for all positive x, and suppose there is a cost β ≥ 0 for recruiting each participant (i.e. independently of whether or not they accept the offer). If β > 0, then the unique minimizer of V * F (G, n) subject to an expected cost constraint Cost F (G, n) 
Remark 4.6. The requirement that F be twice differentiable everywhere is for technical convenience. Our theorems can be generalized to the case where the PDF F is piece-wise twice differentiable by first approximating F with everywhere twice differentiable PDFs and then taking the limit.
We prove these theorems after developing the necessary machinery. Let
For notational convenience, we will often omit the subscripts when their meaning is clear from the context (e.g. M F ,n,λ (G) and H(x) F ,n,λ (G) become as M (G) and H(x), respectively). M (G) will be a function that we would like to minimize, δM |G (Ĝ−G) is the derivative atĜ − G in the directionĜ −Ḡ, which we will want to show is always ≥ 0 at some local minimum. H(x) will turn out to be the derivative of M (G), a sort of point-wise version of δM |G (Ĝ). (1−G(y)) 3 dy, which is positive as long as we are above some point in the support of F (because by Claim 4.1 we know that G is between 0 and 1). By our assumption, the only point less than every element in the support of F that we consider is 0. Thus, the derivative at G in directionĜ:
2λ n x 0 f (y) (1 − G(y) ) 3 dydx is positive unless G and the direction are the same except for at the point 0. However, this is never the case if the direction is non-trivial. And thus this is always strictly positive.
To prove our theorems we will need to minimize objectives that look like M (G). The following lemma shows thatḠ F ,α is the unique minimizer of M (G), for a particular choice of α.
LEMMA 4.9. For allĜ, δM F ,n,λ|Ḡ F, λ n 2 (Ĝ −Ḡ) ≥ 0. Moreover,Ḡ F , λ n 2 is the unique CDF G for which this holds.
PROOF. By Claim 4.7 we see that we must show that for allĜ, ∞ 0 (ĝ(x) − g(x))H(x)dx ≥ 0. Bothĝ andḡ are distribution density functions, so they integrate to one and their difference integrates to 0. Necessarily off the support of G we havê g(x) ≥ḡ(x) = 0 . Thus it is enough to show that H(x) is constant on some region that contains the support of G and that outside this region it is always greater than inside the region.
We show that
(2) For everyĪ k , H(ī k ) = H(j k ) and for every x ∈Ī k , H(x) ≥ H(j k ); and
(3) For x ∈ [0,x], H(x) ≥ H(x).
These three steps suffice to show that for allĜ, δM F ,n,λ|Ḡ F, λ n 2
The last line follows becauseG F , λ n 2 (
At the single pointī k+1 , it might not be thatḠ F , λ n 2 (y) =G F , λ n 2 (y), but because this is a single point, and f (x) is differentiable, this will not affect the calculation.
The same argument works for x ∈ [x,ī 1 ], and x ∈ [j m , ∞) To show (2) observe that:
However, by the definition ofĪ k , forī k ≤ x ≤j k this is less that or equal to 0 with equality when x =ī k .
Finally, we show (3), that for x ∈ [0,x], H(x) ≤ H(x). As in the previous setup we see that:
But this is negative because for x <x we have that ∞ xg (z)dz ≥ 1, butḠ(y) = 0. The uniqueness follows directly from the fact that we found a local minimum and by Claim 4.8 the function is strictly convex over our space which is also convex. PROOF OF THEOREM 4.3. : Let F be twice differentiable for all positive x, and let n be fixed. We minimize V * (G) subject to a expected cost constraint B. From Lagrange Multipliers (see section 2.2) we have
Thus we have that:
where M is define in Equation 1. From Lemma 4.9 we see that Equation 11 implies that G =Ḡ F , 1 λn 2 . By Equation 12 we see that ∞ 0 nxF (x)ḡ F ,n, 1 λ (x)dx = B/n and by Remark 4.2 this uniquely determines λ.
The proof is analogous when we are minimizing the cost with a bound on the variance.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.4. :
where n = ∂Φ ∂x1 |Cost(G) and λ = ∂Φ ∂x1 |V * (G) n. So for any fixedḠ F ,α to be optimal we must have δM F,n,λ|G (Ĝ −Ḡ F ,α ) ≥ 0 for allĜ. However, by Lemma 4.9 we see that if this is the case, then G must be of the formḠ F ,α (x) for some α = λ n 2 = ∂Φ ∂x2 |V * (ḠF,α) ∂Φ ∂x1 |Cost (ḠF,α) .
The RHS, α, is strictly monotonically increasing in α and goes from 0 to infinity as α does, where as the LHS is monotonically decreasing with respect to α (because V * (Ḡ F ,α ) decreases with α and Cost * (Ḡ F ,α ) increases with α, and Φ is convex), and is always positive because Φ is monotone. Because all the functions are continuous, there exists a unique solution for α. Because Φ, Cost and V * are all convex the composition is, and thus this is a global maximum. Now we generalize the results to the setting where the number of participants is not fixed a priori, but there may be some cost β associated with each additional person recruited.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.5. : Thus the cost of the mechanism becomes Cost(F , G, n, β) = n β + ∞ 0 xF (x)g(x)dx and the variance remains the same. We will deal with the setting where we would like to minimize the variance subject to some cost constraint. This give us the following problem:
Using a Lagrange multiplier, we arrive at the equation:
where M is define in Equation 1. From Lemma 4.9 we see that Equation 13 implies that G =Ḡ F , 1 λn 2 . If we let α = 1 λn 2 , Equation 14 then implies that
However, have f (x) = 1 and F (x) = x − 1 for x ∈ [1, 2] . Therefore, we know that the optimal mechanism is a take-it-or-leave-it mechanism parameterized by offer distribution G, defined by the CDF/PDFs:
for some choice of α ∈ [0, ∞). Note that G(1) ≥ 0 and G(2) ≤ 1. Choosing α = 0 would correspond to placing the entire weight of the distribution on a point-mass at $1. Because we will also in general have G(2) ≤ 1, this distribution also places a point mass of weight 1−G(2) = α 3 at $2. Note that offers of $2 are accepted with probability 1, and offers at $1 are accepted with probability 0 and are equivalent to discarding some fraction of the available population. Suppose that our goal is to minimize the variance, subject to the constraint that our expected cost is at most $100. Recall that the expected cost of a survey will be:
Setting n = 100 and setting this quantity to be at most $100, we can solve for α and find that the optimal value of α is:
We plot the corresponding optimal CDF G(x) in figure 5.2. We remark several interesting features of the derived distribution. First, we have G(1) ≈ 0.29, meaning that the mechanism has chosen to discard almost 30% of the population without surveying them (offers at $1 are never accepted and are equivalent to declining to survey an individual). This is because although the population n = 100 is fixed, the optimal population for the desired cost/variance tradeoff is smaller, and the distribution reduces the population accordingly. Second, we have G(2) ≈ 0.59 Therefore, with probability roughly 0.41, the lottery mechanism chooses to make an offer that the agent "cannot refuse": An offer at $2, which will always be accepted. Although such offers always incur high cost $2, they serve to reduce variance.
A Heavy Tailed Distribution and a Separation Between Truthful and Non-Truthful Surveying Mechanisms
Here we consider the case when costs c i ∈ [1, ∞] are distributed according to the heavy tailed distribution. Let us consider the distribution F given by the pdf and CDF: f (x) = 2 x 3 and F (x) = 1 − 1/x 2 . Suppose that we have a fixed population of n = 500 individuals and a constraint that our expected cost should be no more than $1000. We can use our formula to derive that the minimum variance mechanism subject to our cost constraint is a take-it-or-leave-it mechanism which uses parameterized offer distribution G α defined by the CDF and PDFs:
Where ξ is the real root of x 3 + x − 2α. Recalling that the expected cost of a TIOLI survey mechanism parameterized with pdf g is given by: Plugging in our value for n, our pdf g, and setting this quantity to be at most $1000, we can solve for α and find that the optimal value is α * ≈ 0.42. The CDF of this distribution with the optimal value of α is plotted in figure 5.2. Plugging in this value of α gives us a fully specified distribution G, and allows us to calculate that our variance is at most:
We now give a related example which separates the power of truthful lotteries from the power of non-truthful lotteries. Consider again a heavy tailed distribtuion F , this time given by the pdf and CDF: f (x) = 1/x 2 and F [x] = 1 − 1/x. Suppose that we have a fixed population of individuals and an upper bound on the maximum expected cost that we will tolerate. We can again use our formula to derive that the minimum variance mechanism subject to this cost constraint is a take-it-or-leave-it mechanism which uses a parameterized family of offer distributions G α defined by the CDF/PDFs:
Recalling that the expected cost of a TIOLI survey mechanism parameterized with pdf g is given by:
Unfortunately, we find that this integral is divergent for all α > 0! In other words, the expected cost is infinite, and α cannot be set to satisfy our budget constraint. Because we have derived the optimal solution, this shows that no truthful mechanism which supplies an unbiased estimator for the survey statistic can have both finite cost and variance over this distribution on costs. Note that this is not so if we do not require a truthful (but still require an individually rational) survey. Without truthfulness, we can use the allocation rule A(x) = 1 √ x and the "first-price" payment rule P (x) = x. In this case, we find that our expected cost is: n ∞ 1 x · f (x) · A(x)dx = 2n, which is finite for finite n, and our variance is at most: 1 n ∞ 1 f (x)
A(x) dx = 2/n, which is also finite. It is easy to check that as expected, the payment rule that makes this allocation rule truthful gives infinite expected cost. This example serves to separate truthful lotteries from non-truthful lotteries: there exist distributions for which non-truthful lotteries can find unbiased estimators with finite cost and variance, but no truthful lottery can.
DISCUSSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
In this paper, we have initiated the study of truthful, Bayesian-optimal survey design for generating unbiased estimators of a population statistic. Of course, there are many interesting directions left open for future work. For example:
(1) In this paper, we have focused on mechanisms which promise unbiased estimators, and have focused on optimizing properties of these mechanisms (i.e. variance, cost, etc.). However, if the surveyor is in the end interested in accuracy, he may be willing to compute a biased estimator if doing so can significantly reduce variance without increasing cost (error, in the end, is a function both of the bias of the estimator, and of its variance). What do optimal mechanisms look like in the regime of minimizing error, when we cannot necessarily restrict our attention to the Horvitz-Thompson estimator? (2) We have considered mechanisms in which the decision of whether or not to survey each individual is independent of the valuations of other individuals in the population (although of course depenent on the distribution over values). This is an important class of mechanisms because it allows the survey to be distributed amongst many surveyors. Although, because agents are all drawn from the same prior, this restriction seems as if it should be without loss as the population grows large, are substantial improvements possible in the small population regime if we consider mechanisms that may make correlated decisions? (3) We have assumed a known prior over costs, but have otherwise made worst-case assumptions on what the distributions on surveyed types looks like. Is it possible to do substantially better in some cases if we make further (natural) assumptions on the distribution from which player types are drawn? One natural assumption might be that E[q(x)|c(x)] is monotonically increasing in c(x). For example, we would expect this to be the case if q(x) = 1 represents some stigmatized property, and so such individuals might have higher cost for participating in such a survey. (4) What if costs are indeed drawn from some prior distribution, but this distribution is unknown to the mechanism. Can a mechanism which must now learn this distribution over costs compete with the optimal mechanisms derived here, with prior knowledge over the true distribution?
